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The Idea of the "Private":
A Discussion of State Action
Doctrine and Separate Sphere Ideology
Hester Lessard*

1. INTRODUCTION
This essay is a discussion of the formalization in law of a
dichotomy between a natural, private order on the one hand, and a
public sphere of state action and citizenship on the other. The discussion takes place in the context of equality rights and of the philosophical tensions that underlie the delineation of rights in general. Two legal
phenomena are examined: state action doctrine as it has developed in
American equal protection jurisprudence under the Fourteenth
Amendment and separate sphere ideology as a rationalization for sexual discrimination. Under each doctrine, judicial denial of relief is predicated on a pre-ordained and natural compartmentalization of human
experience and on a refusal to perceive the dichotomy as socially
created and legally enforced discrimination. The contradictions inherent in state action jurisprudence are a microcosm of the contradictions
inherent in liberal theories regarding the nature of rights and of the
state. A critique of separate sphere ideology in the context of women's
rights offers a macrocosmic view of social transformation. Although
I shall refer largely to American jurisprudence, the underlying
* Graduated from Dalhousie University Law School with an LL.B. in 1985.
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philosophical questions are of critical importance in Canadian judicial
treatment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The essential message of state action doctrine is that a constitution
protects individuals only from violations of their rights by governments and not from violations by other individuals. Confronted with
this fundamental rule, which in Canada is the ostensible import of
section 32(1) of the Charterand which in the United States is the ostensible import of the negative phrasing of the Fourteenth Amendment,
i.e., "No State shall ... abridge . . . ", thejudiciary must answer the
politically loaded question; "What is state action?", and by implication, its counterpart: "What is private action?" The premise of both
questions is that the state/private distinction is one that courts can
legitimately make. Progress within the liberal state has often meant
the enlargement of the state sphere and the diminution of the private
sphere. A countervailing force is the in terrorein conservative vision of
a totalitarian intrusion of government into every aspect of human experience. Feminist critique of separate sphere ideology goes beyond
the progressive/conservative debate with its assertion that the personal
is by definition political.
Part 2 of this essay examines the tension between natural law and
positivist theories of rights which has undermined the coherence of
state action doctrine since its inception. Part 3 discusses the denial of
full citizenship for women through the positing of a naturally determined division of life into separate spheres. Although this ideology
persists today under the guise of privacy rights, the attainment of
juridical equality by women contains its own public/private split
which also must be overcome in order to achieve substantive equality.
Part 4 briefly traces the development of state action doctrine and
examines the apparent resolution of its contradictions in the context
of defamation law and First Amendment freedoms. Part 5 of the essay
examines the chimerical nature of equality theories that focus onjuridical equality and consign to legal irrelevance, the "private" experience
of victims of discrimination as members of a socially and historically
oppressed class.
2. STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
.PRIVATE DOMAIN
Historically, state action doctrine has been most coherent when
linked to the natural law tradition with its developed and affirmative
notion of rights derived from a pre-government state of nature.
Within this framework, nature entails a necessarily private sphere of
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individual choice, and the public good is comprised of the maximization of the assertiveness of the self which occurs through choices made
within the private sphere. Constitutional entrenchment of rights is a
means of preserving atomized areas of choice from government intrusion. This philosophy, which is most familiarly articulated in the writings of John Locke,I became linked with a conservative economic
ideology in which choice was economic choice exercised in the private
sphere of the marketplace with the consequent constitutionalization
of liberty of contract.
Active judicial protection of this version of economic rights was
given its fullest expression in the case of Lochner v. New York. 2 Although there is earlier judicial support 3 for the Lockean notion that
constitutions protect rights which pre-date political institutions and
which therefore do not require a clear textual basis for their enshrinement, Lochner has come to typify that approach with regard to
economic rights.
The issue in Lochner arose from an employment contract whereby
a New York baker "required or permitted" his employee to work
more than sixty hours per week, contrary to a New York statute. The
natural liberty of the employer to contract for the purchase of labour
without state-imposed constraints was successfully asserted to impugn the constitutionality of the statute. Although no one on the
Bench viewed that liberty as absolute, most adhered to a natural law
approach to the values presented for protection in the case. Justice
Peckman, for the majority, invalidated the offending law in the name
of the "general right of an individual to be free in his person and in
his power to contract in relation to his own labour." 4 Justice Harlan,
in dissent, referred to the power to contract as one of the "inherent
rights belonging to everyone." 5 Only Justice Holmes, also in dissent,
viewed the issue from a philosophical position which differed significantly from that of his colleagues. He opened his short opinion with
the remark that the case "is decided upon an economic theory which
a large part of the country does not entertain." 6 Then with an acuity
which foreshadows the Legal Realists and the political and historical

1 See J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, ed. T.P. Peardon (New York:
The Bobbs-Menill Co., 1952).
2 (1905), 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539.
3 See for example Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648.
4 Supra, note 2 at p. 58.
5 Ibid., p. 65.
6 Ibid., p. 75.
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developments of the thirties, he contrasted the notion of liberty on
which that economic theory is based with the reality of public intervention in public life. He wrote:
The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere
with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth
for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school laws, by the
Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his
money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Sta7
tics.

Injustice Holmes' view, the Fourteenth Amendment notion of liberty
is "perverted" if it is used to invalidate legislation which embodies
majority's opinion and conforms to "fundamental principles as they
have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.",
For Justice Holmes the positivist then, there is nothing inherent about
rights and freedoms. Rather, they have their source in those peculiarly
human artifacts, tradition and law.
State action was not an issue in Lochner because of the obvious
involvement of a state actor in the passage of legislation. However,
what if the courts below invoking a judge-made doctrine of unconscionability had refused to enforce the baker's contract? On one view
of state action, the absence of a specific legislative or executive act
would pose no problem. The judicial act of applying common law
rules to private contractual choices would constitute state action and
consequently, the action would find itself subject to constitutional constraints. In this situation, Justice Peckman for the majority might find
that the courts, not the legislature, had infringed the baker's natural
liberty to freely bargain for the purchase of labour. The underlying
thesis remains the same: government's role, be it through judicial,
legislative or executive acts, is to ensure that the civil order conforms
to the natural order. The judicial task of measuring the constitutionality of state action is relatively simple so long as there is a social consensus on the natural/civil split and the content of the natural order.
However, such a consensus, as Justice Holmes was quick to point
out, has for the most part been illusory. The liberal tradition not only
borrowed from and expanded upon pre-liberal theories of natural

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 76.
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9
rights but it also gave rise to the positivist denial of those theories.
The persistence of both approaches has created confusion whenever
the test for state action is concerned. In the positivist universe, the
seemingly sensible proposition that judicial action is state action
threatens to place constitutional constraints on all private choices and
relationships. For without the natural law assumption of a pre-ordained natural/civil split, jurists are left with no clearcut test of constitutionality. If rights have their source in law apart from any divine
or natural order of morality, then presumably the efficacy and legitimacy of private choice is wholly dependent on law. The consequence
is a retreat to a narrow test, of who or what is a state actor, which
excludes judicial actors and removes common law rules and doctrine
from constitutional scrutiny. The retreat, however, is also accompanied by a failure to provide a coherent explanation for either the
general immunity of private choice or the limited exceptions to that
immunity. I"
The starting point for the development of state action doctrine
in the context of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees is Justice Bradley's 1883 decision in Civil Rights Cases." As with most state action
decisions, it contains both of the contradictory theses regarding the
nature of legal rights. In Civil Right Cases, several black plaintiffs complained of racial discrimination in the provision of services, by private
entrepreneurs, contrary to newly enacted federal civil rights legislation.' 2 The defence countered successfully with the argument that the
legislation was unconstitutional because the Fourteenth Amendment
allowed congressional remedial action only where a state had interfered with Fourteenth Amendment rights. The impugned law
penalized the behaviour of private actors and therefore went beyond
the "corrective" posture permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment.

9 For the classic articulation of the positivist view, see T. Hobbes, Leviathan (New
York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1958).
10 An analysis of state action doctrine in terms of the conflict between natural law
and positivist theories of rights is undertaken in Paul Brest's article: "State Action
in Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Bros. v. Brooks" (1982), 130 U. Penn.
L.R. 1296; Ira Nerken's article: "A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth
Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases
and State Action Theory" (19-7), 12 Harv. Civ. Rts.-Civ. Lib. L.R. 297; and
Lawrence Tribe's chapter on state action in American Constitutional Lai, (New
York: Foundation Press, 1978). Parts 2 and 4 of this essay are particularly indebted
to Ira Nerken's exhaustive and informative commentary.
11 (1883), 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18.
12 Civil Rights Act, 18 Stat. 35 (U.S.A.).
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By itself, this argument departed from the natural law conception of
state action by assuming that a line could be drawn between public
and private acts without examining the relationship between the act
and the natural order. "3Justice Bradley appeared to accept this position
in the statement: "Individual invasion of rights is not the subject of
this amendment." 4 Indeed subsequent cases cite his opinion for that
proposition.Is On the one hand, the decision embodies the state action
test in its narrowest and most cryptic form. On the other hand,
perhaps the terseness ofJustice Bradley's pronouncement conceals an
assumption that because entrepreneurial rights are involved, natural
liberty in the sense of Justice Harlan's inherent right to contract has
been invaded. A look at the rest of Justice Bradley's decision reveals
that he clearly believed that state action could take the form ofjudicial
enforcement. Later in the decision he declared:
It [the Fourteenth Amendment] does not authorize Congress to create a
code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights: but to provide
modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of
State officers executive orjudicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment. 16

Today, the unqualified statement on the one hand that "an individual invasion of rights" is not subject to constitutional constraints,
and on the other that court settlement of private disputes is subject to
constitutional constraints seems paradoxical. If individuals cannot enforce contracts or seek damages in a way that violates the constitutional rights of other individuals, surely this means that "individual
invasions" are indeed the subject of the constitution, albeit only by
way of defence in private litigation.
Ira Nerken in his article on state action' 7 explains the seeming
paradox by looking at Justice Bradley's decision in its historical and
philosophical setting. According to Nerken, the pressures of the Reconstruction era required the North to make concessions toward the
conquered South on the question of racial emancipation under the

13 The same argument under section 32 of the Charter would limit judicial action
to a similar corrective posture when faced with a Charter argument in the context
of private litigation.
14 Supra, note 11 at p. 11.
15 See Corrigan v. Buckley (1926), 271 U.S. 323, 299 F. 899.
16 Supra, note 11 at p. 11.
17 Supra, note 10.
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guise of states' rights.'8 Justice Bradley accommodated this pressure
by drawing on prevailing notions of liberty and proprietary rights in
order to fashion a decision which in outcome was a-step backward
from his previous vision of equal protection expressed in his Slaughter
House Cases'9 dissent. Nerken argues that Justice Bradley's statement
on "individual invasions" should not be read apart from the rest of
his opinion which implicitly relies on natural law theories of rights.
The first step in Justice Bradley's analysis was to posit a separate
sphere where "individual invasions" no doubt do take place but where
such invasions by definition, cannot "destroy or injure" rights. Only
state invasions can do so, The second step was to justify the immunity
of this private sphere of choice from judicial action by reference to a
diminished notion of equal protection or, what Nerken calls, the "fictive option" of bargain and resort to State law. Private actors may
interfere with the enjoyrment of one's rights, but in such situations,
the victim may seek better bargain elsewhere or else resort to state
laws like any other citizen. Implicit in this view is the notion that
equality consists of equal access to legal remedies. This is a far cry
from an earlier meaning of equal protection which, in the fervor of
the post-Civil War decade, diretly addressed the historical fact of black
oppression.
This earlier perception viewed the Fourteenth Amendment as
protection from "discrimination against Negroes as a class" 20 and as
an "exemption from legal discriminations implying inferiority in civil
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of their rights which
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps toward reducing
them to the condition of a subject race."21 Ironically, Justice Bradley's
dissent in Slaughter House Cases, which was decided ten years before
Civil Rights Cases, is one of the more vigorous articulations of this
view of racial equality.
That fervor and willingness to give credence to the collective experience of the black people's subordination is entirely absent from
Justice Bradley's Civil Rights Cases decision. On the contrary, here he
reasoned:

18 Many commentators point out that state action was originally devised to serve
two purposes: the perservation of individual liberty and the maintenance of
federalism. See Tribe, Brest and Nerken supra, note 10.
19 (1873), 16 Wall. 36 at 111, 21 L. Ed. 394.

20 Ibid., p. 81.
21 Strauder v. West Virginia (1880), 100 U.S.A. 303 at pp. 307-308, 25 L. Ed. 664.
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When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there
must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the
rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favourite of the laws,
and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the
ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected3.2

In a way, what Justice Bradley is saying is that, state action considerations apart, the discriminations experienced by these black plaintiffs
are not subversive of their fundamental rights of equality because they
can resort to "ordinary modes" of protection.
The device of the "fictive option" as described by Nerken is a
triumph of legal formalism. Through its operation, Justice Bradley
was able to characterize the Court's non-recognition of black plaintiffs' claims as a favour, as a form of deference to the black person's
dignity, by treating him or her equally rather than as a "special favourite of the laws". Any uncorrected violation of rights was the victims'
fault-here symbolized by the failure to resort to state laws that do
not attract corrections by the courts or Congress because they are cosmetically neutral and apply equally to all. This laissez-faire approach
to civil rights, like the laissez-faire approach to economic rights under
a contract, avoids considerations of systemic inequalities and historical
deprivations by focusing on the discrete transaction. Widespread discrimination becomes a nonjusticiable matter of isolated, private, bargained for and "consented to" choices.
Although Justice Bradley's decision came to be viewed as posing
a threshhold test for constitutional application, the actual opinion
makes no sense unless it is read in the light of an affirmative notion
of liberty of contract, which foreshadows Lochner, and a correspondingly diminished notion of equality, which foreshadows Plessy v. Ferguson.' Thus, even without the -state action bar the black plaintiffs in
this case would have been unlikely to succeed. Their experience of
racial discrimination as a class of victims was both privatized and particularized by "fictive option" reasoning and by the privilege ofjuridical equality. State action doctrine merely underscored this privatization, and perhaps more importantly, served the political need to assure
the South that state sovereignty would be respected.

22 Supra, note 11 at p. 25.
23 (1896), 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138. Discussed infra, at Part 4.
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3. SEPARATE SPHERES: THE IDEOLOGY OF WOMAN'S
DOMAIN
Justice Bradley's state action test as interpreted by subsequent
courts came to mean that a whole area of social arrangements was
removed from constitutional constraints because of the absence of an
appropriate public actor in the role of perpetrator. Judicial action, in
spite ofJustice Bradley's clear statement to the contrary, was not state
action.
In Bradwell v. Illinois, 24 Justice Bradley again asserted a demarcation between public and private spheres of action as a basis for denying
Fourteenth Amendment protection, this time in the context of
women's rights. The Supreme Court of Illinois had refused to grant
Mrs. Myra Bradwell a licence to practise law on the grounds of the
ineligibility of females. State action was not an issue as the court in
its licensing capacity conformed to even the most narrow formulation
of the public actor. Mrs. Bradwell challenged the decision by arguing
that pursuit of a livelihood as an attorney was one of the "rights,
privileges, and immunities of citizenship" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Again, one is confronted with the spectacle of Justice
Bradley flatly contradicting a position he took in Slaughter House
Cases, this time only a couple of weeks before the Bradivell decision.
His dissenting opinion in Slaughter House Cases reads in part:
If my views are correct with regard to what are the privileges and immunities of citizens, it follows that any law which establishes a sheer
monopoly, depriving a large class of citizens of the privilege of pursuing
lawful employment, does abridge the privileges of those citizens . . . does deprive them of liberty as well as property . . . (and) also
deprives those citizens of the equal protection of the law, contrary to the
last clause of the section.2

How does Justice Bradley resolve the contradictions? Again, he
invokes a separate sphere of lesser privilege for female citizens, which
is sanctified by the "nature of things." In stark contrast to his Slaughter
House dissent, his decision in Bradwell asserts as follows:
It certainly cannot be affirmed, as an historical fact, that this (right to
pursue any lawful employment for a livelihood) has ever been established

24 (1872), 16 Wall. 130, 21 L. Ed. 442.
25 Supra, note 19 at p. 122.
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as one of the privileges and immunities of the sex. On the contrary, the
civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference
in the respective spheres and destinies of man and women . . . .Man is,
or shall be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not
to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong,
to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her husband. 6

Theoretically, the Bradwell analysis goes farther than state action
doctrine because it removes the domestic sphere from legal ordering
altogether. A natural rights formulation of state action doctrine is
based on what Karl Marx 7 described as the state/civil society
dichotomy. Bradwell rests on a civil society/woman's domain
dichotomy, or what Fran Olsen28 calls the family/market split. However, an examination of the "fictive option" reasoning of Civil Rights
Cases reveals that the public/private split asserted by state action doctrine was as much a refusal to give content to equality rights as the
public/private split invoked in Bradwell. In both instances, the court
by ostensibly deferring to the sanctity of certain private choices-that
6f entrepreneurs in the market place or that of husbands within an
authoritarian family structure-was ensuring the continuance of the
status quo of pervasive inequality. From another point of view, the cases
can be described as constitutionalizing an affirmative notion of contract rights on the one hand and of familial privacy rights on the other
hand, both at the expense of an enlarged notion of equality.
The legal history of the exclusion of women from full participation in "civil society" is well documented.29 The exclusion took its
most extreme form in the unity principle or the doctrine of marital
merger of identity whereby "under the common law when a woman
married her identity became submerged in that of her husband with
a resultant fusion of their legal personalities." ' From this principle
26 Supra, note 24 at p. 141.
27 See Marx, "On the Jewish Question" in Karl Marx: Early Texts, McClellan ed.
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1971).
28 F. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform"
(1983), 96 Harv. L.R. 1497.
29 This section of the essay is indebted to McCaughan, Legal Status of Married Women
in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1970) and to Olsen, supra.
30 Ibid., pp. 2-4.
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flowed a host of rules which served to deny women control over property, the ability to contract, and the legal redress of disputes arising
in the domestic sphere. Indeed part of the State of Illinois' argument
against Mrs. Bradwell was that as a married woman she had no contractual capacity apart from her husband and therefore no way of establishing attorney-client relationships. As Justice Bradley points out,
civil society is merely reflecting nature in this respect. Although the
decision does not address state action questions, the implication is that
for the state, here represented by the U.S. Supreme Court, the "act"
by giving Mrs. Bradwell her remedy would be unconstitutional state
action in much the way state intervention into the play of the "natural" forces of the market would have been unconstitutional state action
in the pre-New Deal era. The logical outcome of further judicial treatment of Bradwell type claims would have been the constitutionalization of the husband's right of dominion, much in the way liberty of
contract jurisprudence constitutionalized the dominion of accumulated wealth. In fact, an argument can be made that the traditional
notion of the family as a sacrosanct institution has indeed been constitutionalized under the guise of a constitutional right to privacy.
Thomas Grey 3' maintains after a review of the jurisprudence on privacy rights:
These cases strongly suggest that the Court meant what it said in Griswold: that the right or privacy protects only the historically sanctified
institutions of marriage and the family, and has no implication for laws
regulating sexual expression outside of traditional marriage ....

The

contraception and abortion cases are simply family planning cases. They
represent two standard conservative views: that social stability is
threatened by excessive population growth; and that family stability is
threatened by unwanted single parent families, irresponsible youthful
3
parents, and abandoned or neglected children. .

Catherine MacKinnon, expanding on Grey's position, writes:
To fail to recognize the place of the private women's subordination by
seeking protection behind a right to that privacy is thus to be cut off
from collective verification and state support in the same act. The very
place (home, body), relations (sexual), activities (intercourse and repro-

31 T. Grey, "Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court" (1979-80), 43 Law and Contemporary Problems 83.
32 Ibid., pp. 87-8.
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duction), and feeling (intimacy, selfhood) that feminism finds central to
women's subjection form the core of privacy doctrine."

The severance from state support addresses the immunizing effect of
separate sphere thinking which lives on in the constitutionalization of
marital privacy. The severance from collective verification addresses
the further privatizing and particularizing of the experience of subordination under the aegis of formal, juridical equality. MacKinnon goes
on to argue that the feminist response to inequality has been to
politicize the personal rather than transcend it in the manner of liberal
efforts at reform.34
Feminists in Mrs. Bradwell's era sought to break the bondage of
a public/private split imposed on women by drawing parallels between the status of a slave or serf and that of women. Ironically, they
drew on the individualist ideology of the marketplace in order to buttress their demands for equal rights and freedom of choice and to inform their critique of the authoritarian structure of the family.3 Their
efforts were partially rewarded by legislative reforms which repealed
the more egregious common law rules. As women were slowly
granted juridical equality with its full panoply of "fictive options"
within the marketplace and to a certain extent within the family, the
Lochnerian notions that provided the fuel for women's demands were
crumbling in the area of economic inequality, allowing massive government intrusions into the marketplace to correct the abuses of private power. Furthermore, the shift from state neutrality toward preexisting power relationships within the family to state neutrality toward husband and wife as juridical equals, had the same effect on
women's subordination that a comparable shift from slavery to
citizenship had on black subordination. Olsen describes it as a shift
from a direct to an indirect mode of legitimizing oppression. 36 1 would
suggest, additionally, that the shift was from the overt public/private
split of separate sphere ideology to the more covert public/private split
contained within the notion of formal equality. The "fictive option"

33 C. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist
Jurisprudence" (1983), 8 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 635 at
657.
34 Ibid.
35 See Easton, "Feminism and the Contemporary Family" in Heritage of Her Oun,
Cott, N. and E. Pleck, eds. (Oregon: Touchstone Books, 1980), p. 555 and pp.
557-561.
36 Supra, note 28 at pp. 1529-1560.
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of equal access to 'the protection of neutral laws is a device which
removes the private experience of the oppressed as members of a discriminated class from legal relevance. So long as oppressors and oppressed are treated equally by the laws, the patterns of actual choices
exercised by oppressors are constitutionally irreproachable because
they are private. Thus formal equality assumes an ideal world where
discrimination consists of isolated deviations from the norm rather
than dealing with the real world whose starting point is a widespread
historically determined imbalance.
MacKinnon's strategy of politicizing the personal is a challenge
to the sexist bias of privacy doctrine which promotes women's subordination within the private sphere of the family. I suggest, in Part 5
of this essay, that this strategy necessarily entails a collapse of the internal public/private split entailed in "fictive option" reasoning.
4. BENDING THE STATE ACTION RULE: EXCEPTIONS
AND ANOMALIES
The social and political pressures of the depression years led the
courts to reformulate accepted notions of liberty in order to allow
urgently needed public intervention into the private sphere of
economic ordering. Formerly unconstitutional labour legislation on
the Lochnerian analysis passed constitutional scrutiny on the West
Coast Hotels v. Parrish3 analysis. Notions of the inviolability of contractual choice were translated into "liberty in a social organization
which requires the protection of law against the evils which menace
the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people. ' 3 8
The demystification of private choice was spurred on by the Legal
Realist movement of the 1920s and 1930s and entailed an inevitable
blurring of public/private distinctions. Morton Horwitz describes the
impact of the Realists on that distinction as follows:
Parallelling arguments then current in political economy, they ridiculed
the invisible-hand premise behind any assumption that private law could
be neutral and apolitical. All law was coercive and had distributive consequences, they argued. It must therefore be understood as a delegation of
coercive public power to individuals and could only be justified by public
policies. Contract, that most "private" of nineteenth-century legal

37 (1937), 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578.
38 Ibid., p. 391.
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categories, was reconceptualized as simply a delegation of public power
that could bejustified only by public purposes.39

This essentially positivist vision of legal ordering undermined
natural law notions of constitutional rights. It had an equally devastating effect on state action doctrine, creating what Paul Brest describes
as the "positivist dilemma". Without a social and political consensus
regarding the natural ordering of human experience into. exclusive
public and private spheres, Justice Bradley's assumption that judicial
action could be state action seemed to lead logically and inevitably to
the intrusion of the state into every area of daily life-a totalitarian
nightmare. As Brest points out, "more fundamentally, since any private action acquiesced in by the state can be seen to derive its power
from the state, which is free to withdraw its authorization at will,
positivism potentially implicates the State in every 'private' action not
prohibited by law."4 In other words, without a "natural" public/private split to channel our expectations of what it is proper for governments to do and not do, constitutional rights become affirmative
rights which impose affirmative duties on governments to intervene
41
to redress deprivations in civil society.
The consequence of this dilemma was that a narrow test for state
action was adhered to in spite of the theoretical inconsistencies it engendered and long after the Reconstruction era's need to defer to state
sovereignty had passed. Paul Brest uses the recent case of Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks, 42 which concerned property rights and the constitutionality
of self-help credits' remedies, to demonstrate the continuing survival
of those inconsistencies and of ambivalence with regard to the relationship of the citizen to the state. In that case, Justice Rehnquist took an
extremely positivist view of property rights, declaring that they do
not exist somewhere out in the "legal stratosphere" but that they are
comprised of the "statutory and decisional law" of the jurisdiction.
However because, as he pointed out, it would "intolerably broaden"
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the "mere exis39 M. Horwitz, "The History of the Public/Private Distinction" (1982), 13 U. Penn
L.R. 1423 at 1426.
40 Supra, note 10 at p. 1301.
41 It has in fact been suggested to me by Professor McBride that an alternative way
of addressing the public/private split in section 32(1) of the Canadian Charter is
to argue that section 7 does impose affirmative duties on the state, and that therefore it makes no sense to interpret section 32(1) as posing a threshhold test for
constitutional application.
42 (1978), 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729.
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tence of a body of property law" is state action, he fell back on the
essential dichotomy between public and private acts. 4 3 In the course
of his reasons, justice Rehnquist cited Civil Rights Cases for the proposition that "most rights secured by the Constitution are protected
only against infringement by governments."" This characterization
ofjustice Bradley's decision as creating a narrowly defined threshold
requirement of state action, which precludes any discussion of the substantive issues, remains a testimony to the judiciary's tenacious self
perception of being a neutral arbiter in providing rememdies to private
litigants. However, where the inter-relationship between public and
private power either via public acquiescence in private acts or judicial
redress of private claims has resulted in such gross transgressions of
constitutional rights that the Court feels compelled to intervene, it has
spawned a host of unworkable and extremely malleable exceptions to
the strict public/private split.
On the face of it, Marsh v. Alabama45 seems to offer the most
viable of those exceptions. In Marsh, the private owners of a company
town sought to prevent a Jehovah's Witness from distributing religious literature on its sidewalks. The town managers had told her that
she needed a permit to distribute literature and that no permit would
be issued to her. Upon her refusal to leave the sidewalk, she was arrested and charged under an Alabama statute for remaining on the
premises of another after being asked to leave. Her defence to the
charge was that to penalize her in this manner constituted an infringement of her rights to freedom of the press and of religion under the
First Amendment.
Read by itself, the Marsh decision could be viewed as a return to
a notion of state action that flows from a natural law conception of
rights. Although the case later came to stand for the "governmental
function" exception to the state action rule, Justice Black writing for
the Court approaches the issue in terms of balancing proprietary rights
against rights of expression. However, injustice Black's view, the liberty of the citizen to own property must give way to fundamental
rights of expression-in contrast to Justice Bradley's balancing of
equal protection against contractual rights. This is because rights of
expression are essential to the integrity of the democratic process. He
wrote:

43 Ibid., p. 160, and note 10 at p. 165.
44 Ibid., p. 156.
45 (1946), 326 U.S. 501, 66 S. Ct. 276.
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When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must
here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred
position. As we have stated before, the right to exercise the liberties
safeguarded by the First Amendment "lies at the foundation of free government by free men" and we must in all cases "weigh the circumstances
and . . . appraise the . . . reasons . . . in support of the regulation . . . of the rights." Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161. In our view
the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the
public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to
govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and46 the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a state
statute.

Although Justice Black did take time to point out the ways in
which the corporate proprietor resembled a state actor, his decision
does not seem to be overly concerned with the state action problem.
Rather it seems to assume, in the style of Lochner and parts of Civil
Rights Cases, that the boundary line between public and private is evident. However, unlike those cases, the line must give way because the
processes of decision-making in a democratic community are at stake.
Later cases, however, emphasize the peculiar aspects of the fact
situation in Marsh and treat the case as a limited exception to the narrow state action rule. The erosion began in Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza.47 There, the Court applied Marsh
reasoning to a dispute between the proprietor of a supermarket and
its employees who sought to exercise their rights of expression by
picketing in front of the parcel pick-up and in the shopping centre
parking lot. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the issuance of
an injunction on the basis of trespass. The Supreme Court reversed
that decision, invoking the "goal of free expression and communication that is at the heart of the First Amendment." However, Justice
Black in dissent objected strongly to this use of his reasons in Marsh:
In affirming petitioners' contentions the majority opinion relies on Marsh
v. Alabama, supra, and hold that respondents' property has been transformed to some type of public property. But Marsh was never intended
to apply to this kind of situation. Marsh dealt with the very special situation of a company-owned town, complete with streets, alleys, sewers,

46 Ibid., p. 509.
47 (1968), 391 U.S. 308, 88 S. Ct. 1601.
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stores, residences, and everything else that goes to make a town. The
particular company town involved was Chickasaw, Alabama, which, as
we stated in the opinion, except for the fact that it "is owned by the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation . . . has all the characteristics of any other
American town. The property consists of residential buildings, streets, a
system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which
business places are situated." 326 U.S., at 502. Again toward the end of
the opinion we emphasized that "the town of Chickasaw does not function differently from any other town." 326 U.S., at 508. I think it is fair
to say that the basis on which the Marsh decision rested was that the property involved encompassed an area that for all practical purposes had been
turned into a town; the area had all the attributes of a town and was
exactly like any other town in Alabama. I can find very little resemblance
between the shopping center involved in this case and Chickasaw,
Alabama. There are no homes, there is no sewage disposal plant, there is
not even a post office on this private property which the Court now considers the equivalent of a "town"."
And later:
But I respectfully suggest that this [the majority's] reasoning completely
misreads Marsh and begs the question. The question is, under what circumstances can private property be treated as though it were public? The
answer that Marsh gives is when that property has taken on all the attributes of a town, i.e., "residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers,
a sewage disposal plant and a 'business block' on which business places
are situated." 326 U.S., at 502. 19

The erosion became more evident in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner0
which narrowed the majority's reasons in Logan Valley by holding that
the exercise of rights in shopping centres must somehow relate to the
business of the shopping centre. Thus union picketers were constitutionally acceptable; anti-war leafleters were not.
Finally, in Hudgens v. NLRB,"' the Court decided that the distinction drawn in Lloyd was unmanageable. The Court retreated to the
apparent safety of a tidy public/private split and vindicated Justice
Black's narrow interpretation of his own reasons in Marsh. In sum,
Marsh came to stand for a governmental function test in which the
descriptive attributes of state power were more important than the
actual impact of corporate power on community life.
48
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A second exception to the state action rule emerged from the case
of Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority.5 2 Here the Court, rather than
undertake the treacherous task of fashioning a logical exception, or
worse yet, of re-examining the theoretical foundations of state action
doctrine, proposed that the key was to find an appropriate degree of
government involvement in the transaction at issue by examining each
case in its context. In Burton, a restaurant, which leased its premises
from a state owned and operated parking garage, refused to serve coffee to the appellant solely because of the appellant's race. The Supreme
Court of Delaware denied relief on the basis that the restaurant was
acting in a purely private capacity. Justice Clark, writing for the
majority, began his analysis with Justice Bradley's "individual invasions" formula. However, he went on to explain that the state can
become involved in private conduct to such a significant extent that
the threshold requirement of a state actor is met. Once again, the focus
was not on the negative impact of private power on fundamental
rights but rather on the descriptive aspect of the particular situation
before the Court. The financial arrangements between the Parking Authority and the restaurant were examined along with the physical integration of the two functions within the building. The degree of public involvement required in order to trigger constitutional application
remained obscure. Justice Clark asserted that "to fathom and apply a
precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal
Protection clause is an impossible task."- 3 He proposed instead that
"only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-obvious involvement of the state in private conduct be attributed its true
significance."14 Thus once more, the Court tailored the exception to
the state action rule to the details of the dispute before it. This myopic
focus left out the broad contextual facts of pervasive racial discrimination and its relationship to the exercise of private power.
Finally, in Reitman v. Mulkey 5 the Court again skirted the issue
by reference to yet another extremely elusive standard, that of "authorization and encouragement." The case involved the repeal by a
State legislature of a State constitutional provision which prohibited
racial discrimination in housing. The repeal effectively immunized the
housing market from equality constraints. This put the Court in a
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difficult position. If it found that the repeal itself was unconstitutional,
the implication would be that a legislative failure to enact protection
where racial discrimination pervades private transactions is also unconstitutional. Thus the public/private distinction could dissolve and
the State would find itself encumbered with a positive duty to correct
the abuses of private power. Instead the Court rested its decision on
the finding that the repeal "authorized and encouraged" racial discrimination. The Court reiterated Justice Clark's sentiments that articulating an "infallible formula" for determining state action is an
"impossible task".
Against this background, the cases of Shelley v. Kraemer 6 and
New York Times v. Sullivan5 7 seem to be curious anomalies. They cannot accurately be described as exceptions to the state action rule.
Rather they are more in the nature of a different conceptual approach
to the state action problem, an approach in some ways reminiscent of
Justice Black's initial balancing of substantive rights in Marsh.
Shelley v. Kraemer is especially anomalous because, unlike New
York Times v. Sullivan, it never became a case of any precedential
weight. Decided in 1948, just two years after Marsh and several years
before the shopping centre cases, Burton and Reitman, it cursorily rejected state neutrality in the provision of court remedies. ChiefJustice
Vinson declared:
It has been recognized that the action of state courts in enforcing a substantive common law rule formulated by those courts, may result in the
denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment even though
the judicial proceedings in such cases may have been in complete accord
with the most rigorous conceptions of procedural due process.A'

Presumably the reason subsequent cases avoided Shelley and fell
back on either the public function analysis in Marsh or developed
equally unsatisfactory alternative standards for finding state action is
because of the fear that Shelley, in Justice Rehnquist's words in Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, would '"intolerably broaden" the reach of the constitution, i.e., the positivist's dilemma. Chief Justice Vinson has been
faulted for his claim in Shelley that he was not overruling previous
law. Although it is difficult to reconcile his decision with cases that
dealt with similar covenants, 9 he was in fact simply reviving Justice
56
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Bradley's original statement that judicial action was indeed state action. Only now it was no longer accompanied by Justice Bradley's
assumption that the natural order with its separate compartment for
"individual invasions" would of course provide a workable test for
separating constitutional judicial action from unconstitutional judicial
action.
Unlike Shelley, New York Times v. Sullivan has not been relegated
to obscurity. It concerned a libel suit between private litigants in
which the defendant raised a First Amendment defence. The Court
found no need to go through the contortions of public function
analysis or Burton type "sifting and weighing" of the circumstances
to find an appropriate degree of government acquiescence. Instead,
Justice Brennan announced in a manner reminiscent of Chief Justice
Vinson:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press.
It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it
is common law only, though supplemented by statute .... The test is
not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the
form, whether such power has been exercised. 60

Why is the implication of the state in private law adjudication so
obvious as to be unremarkable in Sullivan, while the same implication
in Shelley has been treated as a radical and dangerous step towards an
intolerable constitutionalization of daily, private life? I believe the answer lies in judicial attitudes toward the underlying substantive
claims. The nature of the First Amendment values of free speech and
free press required the Sullivan court to consider the private dispute
before them "against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open."61 Thus, in order to avoid imposing a
regime of self-censorship on the press via the common law rules of
libel which could result in suppression of truthful speech and ultimately in damage to political health, the Court felt obliged to allow
some leeway for the expression of possibly defamatory, untruthful
speech.

60 Supra, note 57 at p. 265
61 Ibid., p. 270.
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The change in approach becomes even clearer in the subsequent
case of Gertz v. Robert Welch62 which modified the Sullivan rule. In
Sullivan, the plaintiff was a police chief who claimed he had been implicitly maligned by an ad placed in the New York Times by four civil
rights activists. In Gertz, the plaintiff was a lawyer who had prosecuted a notorious civil suit and was consequently labelled a communist in a magazine article. The suit against the magazine failed at
the state level on the basis of the Sullivan rule. However, the Supreme
Court in Gertz limited the rule to public debate on public figures by
invoking the countervailing value of "the essential dignity and worth
of every human being" and the "protection of private personality."6
Thus constitutional protection was denied, not because the defendant
was a private actor but because a balancing of the substantive claims
favoured a privacy right that fostered human dignity.
5. BEYOND PUBLIC/PRIVATE: A REVISED THEORY OF
EQUALITY
There are two essential lessons in terms of state action doctrine
and equality that may be gleaned from the defamation cases. The first
is that the abandonment of a formalistic dichotomy between private
and public action does not necessarily entail a totalitarian intrusion of
the state into our private lives. The fact that constitutional application
is an issue of substantive policy which is linked to the right asserted,
does not rule out consideration of countervailing values. The second
is that although it is a good deal more satisfying to tailor the boundaries of state responsibility to the scope of the substantive claim rather
than rely on an arbitrary and unworkable test, the consequences for
equality claimants are not likely to be very significant if notions of
equality retain their own internal public/private split, thus remaining
largely procedural in content. In order to give substantive content to
equality rights, the private-in the sense of legally irrelevat-world
of the victim's actual 'xperience of oppression must be given credence. A review of the cases discussed so far and equality jurisprudence in general makes this latter point clearer and perhaps explains
the feminist strategy of politicizing the personal.
In Civil Rights Cases, Justice Bradley quite clearly made the point

62 (1973), 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997.
63 Ibid., p. 339.
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that action by judicial officers could be state action. However, he was
able to avoid a direct examination of the consequences of that position
because the corrective legislation at issue made no distinction between
states with differing common law responses to discrimination. Thus
he could state that it was unnecessary to go on to decide the very
different question of whether there actually is a constitutional right to
enjoy equality in the provision of services. However, as discussed in
the earlier part of this essay, his use of "fictive option" reasoning
suggests that he was actually relying on a notion of "equal protection
of the laws" which was entirely procedural in content. This description of equality has very little to do with an articulation of equal protection which guarantees non-discrimination "against the negroes as
a class, or on account of their race, '" 64 a notion which looks at transactions in the context of social and historical conditions. Instead, equality as articulated in the subsequent case of Barbierv. Connelly, 5 is viewed as a value-neutral principle which corrects the over-inclusiveness
or under-inclusiveness of legislative or common law classifications in
relation to their purposes. Such an approach examines technique
rather than content, means rather than ends. Thus it would be somewhat illusory to argue that Justice Bradley would have reached an entirely different decision if the focus of the impugned legislation and
of the evidence led, had been on specific state common law or statutory rules that effectively discriminated against "negroes as a class."
This contention is borne out by later cases which did proceed on that
footing, most notably Plessy v. Ferguson,6 which sanctioned widespread Jim Crow legislation under the "separate but equal" doctrine.
As Nerken points out, after Plessy, resort to state law by black people
would do no more than vindicate their right not to be put in the same
railway cars or schools as white people, much in the way that after
Attorney General of Canada v. Bliss,67 resort to legal redress of pregnancy discrimination would do no more for Canadian women than
vindicate their rights not to be treated differently than other pregnant
women. Although American equal protection jurisprudence has
sought to stretch the focus on legislative technique to achieve substantive goals, the limitations of a process-oriented definition of equality
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often result in those efforts backfiring. The affirmative action/reverse
discrimination cases provide a good illustration of this."8 Furthermore,
although a value choice may be implicit in a choice of technique-for
example that certain classifications are suspect-the effect of claiming
that judicial decision-making merely involves the application of neutral, means-oriented rules is not only to remove the complaint from
the setting which compelled the implicit value choice in the first place,
69
but also to present it as a one-dimensional, ahistorical phenomenon.
Thus, Brown v. Board of Education,7 which in fact did look at social
patterns of subordination and exposed the sophistic reasoning of Plessy
in favour of equality of opportunity, ultimately gave black children
neither the right to an integrated education7 nor a right to equality
of resources of their schools.72 Rather, as Brown was interpreted in
later cases, it gave them a right to remain in black and impoverished
school districts so long as district boundaries had been arrived at in a
neutral manner. 73 This approach to equality attests to the positivist
emphasis on procedural justice which stems from the conviction that
it is philosophically impossible to resolve normative conflicts. Thus
in positivist terms, a substantive normative theory of equality is
philosophically and legally untenable.
It is no wonder then that the collapse of the public/private
dichotomy is of no consequence in Sullivan and is threatening in Shelley. Sullivan, like Marsh, is a vindication of a right which has traditionally been linked to the legitimation of the democratic political process
rather than to any substantive goals that the process is purportedly
setting out to achieve. It is significant that in the "white primary"
cases where the claim centres around the frustration of the right to
vote by private associations, the Court also has comparatively little
trouble with the state action issue. 4 Thus the critical difference between Civil Rights Cases and Sullivan does not lie in the approach to

68 See Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke (1978), 98 S. Ct. 2733, 438 U.S.
265.
69 This analysis draws on Alan Freeman's discussion of equal protection in
"Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine" (1977-78), 62 Minn. L.R. 1049.
70 (1954), 347 U.S. 483, 75 S. Ct. 753.
71 Milliken v. Bradley (1974), 418 U.S. 717, 402 F. Sup. 1096.
72 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct.
1278.
73 Supra, notes 70 and 71.
74 See Terry v. Adams (1953), 345 U.S. 461, 73 S. Ct. 809.
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state action. Indeed, a closer examination ofJustice Bradley's decision
reveals that the two decisions are not that far apart on that issue.
Rather, the difference occurs in the replacement of the market process
with the political process as the institution that legitimates judicial deference to private choices. On the other hand, Shelley implies a public
interest that is not purely procedural in that it does indeed include a
substantive right to provision of services, in this case housing, and
abandons "fictive option" reasoning and a notion of equality that is
satisfied by equal access to cosmetically neutral laws. As Lawrence
Tribe points out, an assertion that Shelley was rightly decided is an
assertion that "neutrality does not suffice in matters of racial segregation in housing. '75 The finding that judicial action is state action is
not nearly so threatening as the finding that this is unconstitutional
state action. It is on this point that Shelley radically departs from Justice Bradley's analysis, namely through its requirement of real alternatives, rather than "fictive options".
The requirement of real alternatives by the Shelley court unfortunately can only be implied. I have suggested above that this is the
heart of the Shelley decision and the true reason why subsequent
courts refrained from following its lead. I would further suggest that
the inquiry into the historical and social factors surrounding a complaint, which this requirement of alternatives automatically entails,
contains the only workable measuring stick for unconstitutional state
action in a legal regime that professes to give substantive content to
equality without reference to a divine or natural order of rights. The
unconstitutional discrimination in Shelley cannot be distinguished
from the discrimination inherent in any contractual choice, without
attention to context. At some point in the spectrum, contractual
choices are legitimately private; that is, they are legitimately discriminatory in the broad sense of that word. That point is reached by
taking account of social and historical realities.
Placing the Shelley decision in its context makes the case seem
less peculiar, less radical. That the Shelley court had access to those
sociological facts is made very clear by Richard Kluger in his account
of the background of the case. 76 Kluger points out that by the time
Shelley reached the Supreme Court the use of racially restrictive covenants had become so widespread that the Federal Housing Authority
drew up a model covenant and promoted its use in the interest of

75 Supra, note 10 at p. 1168.
76 Simple Justice (New York: Knopf, 1976), pp. 245-55.
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social stability. Under the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy, public
housing projects were officially segregated, thus creating a situation
in which white units would remain vacant due to a lack of applicants
while black applicants were put on long lists for black units.77 Three
of the Justices who were to hear the Shelley case disqualified themselves, and as Kluger has noted, the "inference most widely drawn
(by the disqualification) was that they themselves owned or occupied
premises covered by restrictive covenants."" However, what is
perhaps more significant is that by 1948, the black housing crisis had
generated enough political pressure to alter attitudes at the executive
level of the federal government. A presidential committee urged the
Justice Department to enter into the fight against restrictive covenants.
Consequently, the Department submitted an amicus curiae brief to the
Shelley Court which maintained that the segregation of black people
in urban slums which resulted from restrictive practices was contrary
to the national interest. For its part, the N.A.A.C.P. team of lawyers
who litigated the case presented voluminous "Brandeis briefs" incorporating a wide range of economic, sociological and medical data.
The Court was literally inundated with material on the social effects
of discrimination; the Court had clear signals that the political will
was receptive to a change. Although today the decision seems legally
insecure and perhaps radical, in actuality the Court chose an outcome
that was comparatively safe. A week after the Supreme Court agreed
to hear Shelley, President Truman declared in an address to the
N.A.A.C.P.: "The extension of civil rights today means not protection of the people against government, but the protection of the
people by the government.'" 9 That statement by itself should have
indicated to the Court that it was time to dismantle state action doctrine, as well as to revise notions of equality. The Shelley decision in
effect performed both of those tasks, unfortunately without setting
out a framework to guide analysis in future decisions.
In some aspects feminist critique can be viewed as an attempt to
deal with the analytic gaps left by equality theories which fail to give
legal relevance to that collective experience of women in the way that
the Shelley court gave relevance to the historical and social facts of
black experience. The attainment of juridical equality for women in
the early 20th century within the family, the market, and at the polls

77 Ibid., pp. 246-47.
78 Ibid., p. 254.
79 Ibid., p. 250.
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has proven as illusory as the attainment ofjuridical equality for black
people after the Civil War. The position articulated by writers such as
Catharine MacKinnon and Fran Olsen that substantive equality requiries the abrogation of the public/private split is a response to the
historical fact that formal equality exists side by side with societal acceptance of informal and private treatment of women as men's inferiors. The granting of a legal capacity to a woman to bargain with
her husband for a share of family property or with her employer for
better wages does little to remedy the overall economic dependence
of women in society. Instead of deferring to the separate sphere of
authoritarian hierarchical arrangements within the traditional family,
the law is now deferring to the separate sphere of private individualized choices which to a great extent preserve the expectations
of a white male hierarchy and of a sexual and racial division of labour.
As with the covenant in Shelley, discrete transactions between men
and women are constitutionally irreproachable (apart from state action
considerations) if considered on an individual basis and if measured
against an "equality of opportunity" standard of justice. Reforms
which achieve formal equality thus only privatize and particularize
inequality, encouraging society and Women themselves to blame the
victim of her failures, much in the way Justice Bradley impliedly
blamed the black plaintiffs in Civil Rights Cases for their deprivations.
Thus one private domain, that of "fictive options," has replaced
another, that of male hierarchy, with basically the same outcome.
MacKinnon's critique in Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State0
sets out to develop a feminist theory of the state which is predicated
on a perception of the state as we know it, as a male institution. She
writes:
The state's formal norms recapitulate the male point of view on the level
of design. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, morals (value judgments)

are deemed separable and separated from politics (power contests), and
both from adjudication (interpretation). Neutrality, including judicial de-

cision-making that is dispassionate, impersonal, disinterested and precedential, is considered desirable and ddscriptive. Courts, forums without
predisposition among parties and with no interet of their own, reflect
society back to itself resolved. Governments of laws not men limits partiality with written constraints and tempers force with reasonable rule
following .... But the demarcations between morals and politics, the
personality of the judge and the judicial role, bare concern and the rule

80 Stipra, note 33.
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of law, tend to merge in woman's experience. Relatively seamlessly they
promote the dominance of men as a social group through privileging the
form of power-the perspective of social life-feminist consciousness reveals as socially male. The separation of form from substance, process
from policy, role from theory and practice, echoes and reechoes at each
level of the regime its basic norm: objectivity."'

She uses the public/private split as a central example of the state's
"recapitulation of the male point of view." Thus in her analysis of
rape laws, she concludes that, here, privacy means that consent can
be presumed unless disproven. The standard for criminality for an act
of rape is based on how the act is viewed by the assailant. This
excludes consideration of the assailed woman's viewpoint from which
purportedly consensual sex is experienced in a social climate that con82
dones and eroticizes male domination.
Her analysis in many respects parallels Alan Freeman's critique
of racial equality jurisprudence in which he maintains that the existing
law recapitulates the perpetrator's perspective, rather than the victim's
perspective. 83 From the perpetrator's view, Freeman writes, inequality
consists of a bundle of specific violations. Therefore ajusticiable complaint and its legal remedy begin and end with the individual violation
at issue. State action doctrine focuses in on the nature of the individual
actors, further limiting the range of justiciable violations and on a
more fundamental level denies the pertinence of the individual, private
experience of inequality. From the victim's perspective, inequality is
a social condition comprised of lack ofjobs, money, housing, and the
consciousness associated with being a member of a permanent -underclass. Thus the content of equality for the oppressed individual is inextricably bound up with the social experience of widespread substantive
inequality of the oppressed class. What should be determinative from
the victim's viewpoint in Shelley is not the nature of the actors nor
the damage inflicted by that particular covenant, but the historical and
social fact of a national housing crisis for black people. Constitutional
application-the intrusion of public into private-should be attuned
to context, to the historical fact of widespread subordination.
Indeed, one might argue that the Court in Marsh v. Alabamna was
doing just that in its consideration of the breadth of the private com-

81 Ibid., pp. 655-56.
82 Ibid., p. 650.

83 Supra, note 69.
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pany's power to effectively terminate fundamental rights and its implicit rejection of the dissent's reliance on the "fictive option" of travelling out of town to exercise those rights. Presumably the same situation would have existed if the company had wielded their power in a
less governmental form to require town dwellers to sign covenants
excluding Jehovah's Witnesses. However, unless the court approved a
methodology that tailored constitutional application to context, state
action doctrine and the governmental function test would preclude
relief in the latter situation. State action doctrine in this sense stands
for the proposition that context is irrelevant because it is private, that
"civil society", the very social conditions that inform the victim's perception of inequality, are hermetically removed from constitutional
regulation. To reject the public/private premise of state action doctrine
is to validate the victim's perspective, to give credence to the individual experience of a social condition, and at the same time to allow
that experience to give substance to an equality right.
There are two objections to such a radical switch in methodology.
First, to replace a mechanical rule with attention to context is to introduce flexibility at the expense of certainty in the law. However, I
would suggest that the contextual facts which should be determinative, verge on the sort of pervasive social conditions that judges traditionally acknowledge under the rubric of judicial notice. Furthermore, as in Shelley such "legislative facts" often play a pivotal if hidden role in judicial decision-making, thus sacrificing judicial credibility on the altar of the abstract value of certainty. What is proposed is
the opening up of a process that is, to a large extent, already in place.
In Canada there is the additional possibility of using section 1 of the
Charterto characterize contextual, historical facts of widespread subordination as a limit which can be "demonstrably justified" on the equal
treatment standard in section 15(1). Section 15(2), which expressly
exempts affirmative action programs from being struck down under
section 15(1), reinforces this interpretation. Furthermore, section 15(1)
itself, which includes a guarantee of "equal benefit of the law," would
seem to invite a focus on the substantive impact of laws that otherwise
appear to treat men and women equally. Although judicial treatment
of these features remains to be seen, their appearance in the Charter
can be viewed as a shift from the perpetrator's perspective to the victim's perspective, from a liberal emphasis on form to a post-liberal
emphasis on substance.
The second objection resembles the positivist dilemma discussed
earlier. MacKinnon's statement that the personal is political is a demand that the victim's perspective be given legitimacy. However, it
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also seems subversive of the equally legitimate desire to safeguard the
privacy that engenders intirmacy, affection, and altruism, as well as
the value of human dignity protected by Gertz. A corollary of this is
the view of some feminists that the values associated with woman's
traditional role are worthwhile and should not be jettisoned in the
process of equalizing sexual relations.
I would suggest that the collapse of the private/public or family/
market split seems threatening because privacy rights have seldom
been articulated in affirmative terms. Instead, privacy has been viewed
as a negative space in hostile opposition to the public sphere and where
one can do as one pleases. Impliedly, intimacy, affection,and the altruism of familial relations can flourish only within such negative
space. The same "delicate flower" theory is also used to resist governmental tampering with the balance of the forces of the marketplace. 8 4 MacKinnon's frontal attack on the public/private split
threatens to devastate these fragile balances and to shatter the climate
which is assumed to be necessary to foster selflessness, caring for
others, and love. In this regard it is as important to extricate altruistic
values from their association with hierarchy as it is to extricate the
values of freedom and equality from their association with the individualist ethic of the market. MacKinnon's expos6 of the sexist bias
of our institutional structures must be accompanied by an affirmation
of non-sexist values. Otherwise we remain locked into a pattern of
repeated mistakes. Olsen uses the example of state attempts at reform
which are based on the altruistic model of the family rather than the
individualist model of the market. Because of the failure to separate
altruism from hierarchy, these efforts reproduce and sometimes increase subordination. Thus within the market, labour legislation such
as that condoned in Muller v. Oregon 3s ultimately underscores and justifies sexual hierarchy. Laws designed to ensure that, within the family, a husband will support his wife and children are likewise altruistically motivated. However, although they limit the husband's ability
to abuse his power, they nonetheless leave most of the power in his
hands.8 6
An alternative approach would start from a definition of privacy
that rejects an interdependency based on need in favour of one based

84 For a discussion of the development and implications of the "delicate flower"
argument, see Olsen, supra, note 28.
85 (1908), 208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct. 324.
86 Supra, note 28.
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on human dignity and the enrichment of the human personality
through social relationships. State intervention would not take the
form of a paternalistic response to need but rather would democratize
social institutions in order to make relationships based on sharing and
intimacy possible in a non-hierarchical context. Within this
philosophical framework, the public, in the sense of civil society, becomes integral to the private in the sense of personal fulfillment. An
example of this inter-relationship is illustrated in a series of cases before the European Commission on Human Rights in which the right
of a transsexual to have public registries reflect his or her gender
change was seen to flow from Article 8 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, 7 which protects an individual's right to respect
for his or her private life. In VanOosterwijck v. Belgium, 8 Judge Van
Der Meesch stated in his concurring opinion:
A man or woman who is unable to obtain recognition of his or her sexual
identity, an aspect of status which is inseparable from his or her person,
will be unable to play his or her full role in society. As has been said, the
right to such recognition is a general principle of law. 9

An analogous argument from the feminist point of view would maintain that legal rules which impose male norms on women are a form
of non-recognition by the state which interferes with personal fulfillment and with the concomitant ability to "play a full role in society."
Thus public and private are no longer in hostile opposition but verify
and support each other. The "private" remains a valid distinction as
in legitimately "discriminatory" contractual choices or Gertz type
values of human dignity, but the reference to community can no
longer be evaded by an invocation of an a prioripublic/private split.
6. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the state action doctrine forces one to re-examine
the assumptions that underlie the ideal of constitutions as contracts
between governments and citizenry whose terms outline inviolable
boundaries of power. That essentially natural law theory of govern-

87 Signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1954, 213 U.N.T.S. 222. My
thanks to Professor P. Girard for alerting me to the European Commission cases.
88 (1981), 3 E.H.R. 557. See also X v. Federal Republic of Gernmany (1977), 11 D.R.
16 (1979), 17 D.R. 21.
89 Ibid., p. 557.
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ment ignores the phenomenon of modem corporate power, which,
because of the accepted deference by government to private action
that our culture identifies with freedom, can and often does effectively
terminate individual rights. On the other hand, the positivist view of
rights, as having their source in law, in its extreme form rejects the
possibility of a substantive normative theory of rights and thus offers
no guidance for limiting state intrusion into individual private lives.
The tension between natural rights and positivist theories manifests itself in the inconsistencies of state action jurisprudence. From
the point of view of equality claimants, the resolution of the conflict
in defamation case law is ostensible only. In New York Times v. Sullivan
and Gertz v. Robert Welch, constitutional application was impliedly
treated as an issue of substantive policy rather than as a threshhold
issue to be determined by an unworkable distinction between private
and public actors. However, the core values that were being protected
by this change in methodology, freedom of speech and of the press,
were procedural in nature. A comparable methodology which tailored
constitutional application to the scope of equality rights as they have
been defined in liberal theory would not change the outcome of most
cases. Because liberal theories of equality have been preoccupied with
equal access, opportunity, and treatment rather than with inequalities
in outcome and condition that are rooted in social and historical imbalances, they in a sense contain their own internal public/private split.
A process-oriented, formal theory of equality focuses only on the
even-handedness of the application of legal rules and thus treats as
legally irrelevant the private experience of victims of discrimination
as members of a class of victimized individuals. Thus to subject common law as well as statutory rules and judicial as well as legislative
action to constitutional scrutiny is to alter the formal structure ofjudicial analysis without effecting a difference in terms of remedying the
substantive inequalities which define. the experience of inequality from
the victim's viewpoint. A coherent doctrine of state action requires a
shift in focus from the search for a sufficiently "public actor" to the
contextual facts of widespread subordination.
Feminist critique which links substantive equality to abrogation
of an arbitrary public/private split mandates not only that judicial
weight be given to the private experience of subordination but also
that the values traditionally associated with privacy rights be redefined. Only when privacy has been linked to affirmative, non-authoritarian notions of human fulfillment and dignity will the tension
between substantive equality and human freedom achieve a balance
that is acceptable to a diverse human community.

